


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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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USSR-Berlin: Marshal Konev's 5 April agreement with General Clarke to resume normal operations of the Soviet and US Military Liaison Missions probably was prompted by the Soviet leaders' desire to avoid actions which might jeopardize prospects for moving ahead in the next round of negotiations with the US on a Berlin settlement. Konev accepted the US view that the Huebner-Malinin agreement of April 1947, governing the liaison missions, should be reaffirmed. This, coupled with the continuing suspension of Soviet flights in the air corridors and the absence of further harassments of Western military ground traffic to West Berlin, suggests that, following the Rusk-Gromyko talks at Geneva, the Soviets have taken a more favorable view of the chances for an eventual Berlin agreement. They may also intend to maintain a posture of caution and restraint pending further developments in negotiations. [REDACTED]

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Algeria: According to the US Embassy in Tunis, there are indications that elements of the Algerian rebel army (ALN) who have often disagreed with their political leaders are opposed to rights and economic concessions given France at Evian, and are attempting to organize political opposition to the provisional Algerian government (PAG). This ALN group reportedly looks to PAG vice premier Mohammed Ben Bella, now touring the Middle East, as its political champion and is planning an elaborate reception for Ben Bella's mid-April arrival in Tunisia. The PAG, aware of these developments, is moving loyal ALN units into key centers inside Algeria before the dissident influence can manifest itself there.

(The OAS in Algeria is confronted with popular acceptance of the cease-fire and of the provisional executive everywhere)

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except in Algiers and Oran. This development should facilitate the rapid assumption of control by local forces responsible to the provisional executive and release French troops to supplement security forces in Algiers and Oran. Although the OAS still has a strong capability for terrorism, despite having suffered significant tactical defeats, it will probably be restricted in the future to actions by groups operating from urban European quarters.

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Burma: Since seizing power on 2 March the military oligarchy headed by General Ne Win has extended its control over all aspects of the nation's political and economic life. The abandonment of constitutional procedures, highlighted by the abolition of the independent court system, contrasts sharply with the limited authoritarianism of his 1958-60 regime. Although there is no evidence of a shift in Burma's neutral foreign policy, the government's approach to domestic economic problems suggests a stronger trend toward socialism as well as toward authoritarianism. [REDACTED]
(Backup, Page 3)

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Argentina: President Guido and the political leaders he has consulted have not yet agreed on a plan to meet the key problem of dealing with the Peronista electoral victories. Leaders of the two main non-Peronista parties have taken a public stand in favor of validating the Peronista victories in 11 provinces. A widely respected conservative leader believes that these party positions will make it difficult for Guido to call a special session of congress, as requested by the military, to deal with the Peronista problem and a new electoral law. He believes that the crux of the problem is not the Peronistas but lack of cooperation among democratic parties in meeting a Peronista-leftist threat.

A message from Frondizi on 6 April to those elements of his party who are calling for his reinstatement reportedly urge that they be calm and not further upset the country.

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[REDACTED] (Backup, Page 7)

Dominican Republic: Popular support for the ruling Council of State has weakened during the past several days as a result of press and verbal attacks on the council by the National Civic Union (UCN)--the country's largest party. Scattered violence has occurred, instigated by extreme leftists. Reports that some council members were considering the formation of a "new party" or a coalition of parties opposed to the UCN have also served to create uneasiness. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] (Backup, Page 8)

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

*Syria: [Syrian military leaders are having difficulty in restoring civilian government. Political leaders are reluctant to participate in the formation of a new government, stating that they are "not interested in governing for ten days and going to prison on the eleventh"--an allusion to the fate of the Dawalibi cabinet. The army command appears overconfident regarding the extent of its suppression of the recent pro-Nasir upsurge in Syria. While the command is aware that any new regime must ultimately be less conservative than the Dawalibi government, they have indicated that they have no intention of implementing those parts of the Homs agreement which are designed to placate pro-Nasir sentiment.]

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[The command's present middle-of-the-road policies run counter to the interests of the country's two most important political groups--the extremely conservative business and property-owning elements who backed the Dawalibi regime, and the leftist-socialist pan-Arabists. With support from neither the right nor left, the life of the present army junta is likely to be short, and a shift to the left in its composition is almost certain to take place.]

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[REDACTED] 25X1

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USSR Agrees to Resume Normal Operations of Military Liaison Missions in Germany

Although there were several indications that the USSR might use the incidents in March involving US and British Military Liaison Mission personnel in East Germany to curtail or terminate the activities of these missions, Moscow apparently decided that possible gains on this front were outweighed by the risk that such tactics might upset the process of negotiation with the US.

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The joint communiqué issued on 5 April at the conclusion of a "friendly" discussion between Marshal Konev and General Clarke apparently disposed of the 20 March incident in which a US Military Liaison Mission car was disabled by gunfire and the US personnel detained by the East Germans for 26 hours. Some of the restrictions which the USSR had placed on the US mission in Potsdam in retaliation for US prohibitions against the travel of the Soviet mission in Frankfurt were lifted on 3 April.

The Huebner-Malinin agreement of 1947 which was to guide the "future operations of the missions" was a formal agreement between the US and USSR to exchange military liaison missions and accredit them to the respective military headquarters in the occupied zones. It stipulated that mission personnel are to enjoy "complete freedom of travel without escort or supervision" in the US and the Soviet zones.

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Ne Win's Regime in Burma Becoming
Increasingly Authoritarian

One of the military government's first acts after detaining the major leaders of U Nu's government was to replace all elected officials by appointed councils responsible directly to the Union Revolutionary Council (URC). During its second week in office, the URC announced that its chairman, General Ne Win, was vested with all legislative, administrative, and judicial powers; on 30 March, it announced the suspension of the Supreme Court and the High Court and their replacement by a newly appointed Union Chief Court as the court of final appeal. The former justices of the two courts, given life tenure under the constitution, have been dismissed from office. Although the change might have appeared justified because of the thousands of cases which the former justices had allowed to accumulate, this break with the tradition of an independent judiciary stands as the government's most direct rejection of parliamentary democracy and the rule of law to which Burmese have been accustomed to pay at least lip service.

There has been less direct action in the economic field, but it is apparent that the military regime intends to establish the same complete control here as in the political field. Brigadier Aung Gyi, Ne Win's second in command, has emphasized the government's intent to press the development of a socialist economy, although assuring a continued role for private investors. He has indicated, however, that the government will exercise strong direction. The American Embassy believes that the URC, in seeking solutions to its economic problems, will draw on the experience of authoritarian states, including Communist China in particular.

Ne Win has frequently stated that the Burmese people have shown that they are not ready for democracy. He has also deplored the role of army personnel in political office, fearing that the temptations to corruption would affect the army's military efficiency. He now has decided, however, to put aside

this consideration in the interest of efficient government for Burma.

So far the Burmese people have shown no overt opposition to the military dictatorship and appear willing to give the new regime a chance to show its worth. The minority peoples, however, are restive under Burman domination and the Burmans themselves are notably intolerant of strong discipline. It is probable that ultimately there will be an attempt to oust Ne Win, perhaps resulting from a split within the army. This danger to the regime remains particularly strong as long as ex-Prime Minister Nu, who still refuses to acknowledge the coup, remains as a potential rallying point.

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Argentine Political Crisis Unresolved

The tentative plan negotiated between the national committee of Frondizi's Intransigent Radical Civil Union (UCRI) and the armed forces--and subsequently endorsed by President Guido--called for a special session of congress in mid-April. The UCRI, which has a majority until the new session on 1 May, was to pass legislation providing for proportional representation, revision of the basic labor law, and the outlawing of "totalitarian parties." The specific problem of the Peronista victories was to be decided in the light of this legislation and consultation among various political groups, some of which have suggested entirely new elections.

Practical politics are behind the reluctance of political leaders to make a more positive effort to help resolve the crisis. It was with great difficulty that Guido managed to complete his cabinet on 6 April--the appointees were generally conservative individuals, rather than party representatives as he had hoped. Important UCRI leaders having political ambitions have denounced Guido and called for Frondizi's return. They ignored the fact that both Frondizi and the UCRI national committee asked Guido, formerly a UCRI member, to take the job. The People's Radical Civic Union (UCRP), the second largest political party, has complicated political negotiations by its call for lifting federal control over five of the provinces where Peronistas won. The UCRP, as well as other opposition parties, endorsed Frondizi's removal, and there is widespread resentment of the adverse reaction abroad.

Lack of progress in political negotiations and foreign criticism of the armed forces for ousting Frondizi are threatening to provoke disunity and competition among the armed services.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Political Tensions in the Dominican Republic

There has been increasing discord among the seven members of the Council of State. In recent weeks some members of the council have appeared to fear a military coup and reportedly believe the national election scheduled for December should be postponed for a year while moderate parties develop leadership and organization.

Though both the council and the UCN privately deny that there is serious disagreement between them, the UCN continues to make statements disturbing to the council. It has insisted on adherence to the election schedule, and on 31 March it sharpened the council's fears of a coup by publicly demanding "revolutionary" measures to purge the armed forces of officers guilty of crimes under the dictatorship. The UCN claimed that it might ask party members to resign from government posts unless its demands were met.

Some members of the council have been reported considering an effort to form an anti-UCN coalition made up of other parties of the center and non-Communist left. The pro-Castro 14 of June party continues its open opposition to the government and was probably responsible for most of the clashes between civilians and security forces which occurred between 30 March and 2 April in a number of provincial towns as well as the capital. The pro-Communist Dominican Popular Movement was responsible for other incidents.

The present top military leadership still appears to be loyal. It is, however, made up of young and inexperienced officers, and is reportedly preoccupied with reorganizing the armed forces into a professional nonpolitical force modeled along US lines. Reactionary officers suspected of having pro-Trujillo sympathies are gradually being retired or reassigned. The greatest threat of antigovernment action by the military probably comes from this reactionary group of officers. Their views may gain wider support in the armed forces if the split in the Council of State deepens

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and results in political divisions that might be interpreted by some officers unaccustomed to a free political system as anarchy and as the last phase before a Communist take-over.

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